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GMO Standards, Endogenous Policy  
and the Market for Information 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. The paper develops a composite index of GMO standards restrictiveness for 60 
countries, assigning objective scores to six different regulatory dimensions. Using this index 
and its components, we empirically investigate the political and economic determinants of 
GMO regulations for 55 countries, controlling for spatial autocorrelation. Results show that 
many of the determinants highlighted in the theoretical literature, such as the structure of the 
agricultural sector and the institutional environment are important determinants of the 
restrictiveness of the GMO regulation. As a key result there emerges a prominent role of the 
market for information, showing that the structure of domestic mass media (public vs. 
private) is an important driver of GMO standards.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, the rapid diffusion of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)1 
has triggered the formation of across-country differences in GMO standards. One 
reason behind this process is related to the different welfare effects induced by 
GMOs on different groups of the society (see Lapan and Moschini, 2004; Veyssiere 
and Giannakas, 2006; Moschini, 2008). Indeed, different GMO regulations may 
reflect the preferences of the various groups involved in the government decision-
making process, like consumers, farmers, and agrochemical and seed companies.  
This consideration motivated a growing interest in the political economy of 
GMO regulation. For example, Anderson et al., (2004) investigated the trade and 
protectionist effect of the GMO regulation of the European Union. Gruère et al. 
(2009), using a proportional voting model, studied the determinants of GMO labeling 
policies. More recently, Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011), exploiting the property 
of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) ‘Protection for Sale’ model, showed how 
factors like country comparative advantage and the strength of the main lobbying 
groups affected the government preferences on GMO standards. 
The majority of these studies are theoretical in nature. Until now we lack a 
comprehensive empirical investigation into the determinants of GMO standards, 
which exploits the large across-country differences in GMO regulation. Indeed, such 
regulatory differences are an interesting source of policy variation that needs further 
explanation. In many rich countries, consumers and green associations are concerned 
with the safety of new biotechnologies, for both health and the environment, and they 
have asked governments to adopt regulations to check for any negative potential 
effects of these products. Other developed countries are cultivating GM crops 
extensively, and they use GMOs to produce manufactured foods without setting 
regulations that could restrict GMO diffusion. Developing countries are often in the 
middle of these two approaches, creating a highly heterogeneous international 
regulatory framework. 
In this paper, we empirically study the determinants of GMO regulation and, to 
this end, we present a new composite index on GMO regulation across a large cross-
                                                          
1
 The first commercially grown GM crop was the Flavr Savr tomato of the Calgene Company. It was 
released on the market in 1994, and its genetic modification consisted in a longer shelf life due to 
ripening with a low decay rate. However, its diffusion was limited. The first extensive GM crop 
appeared in 1996, and it was the herbicide-tolerant soybean called Roundup Ready of the Monsanto 
Company. 
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section of countries, taking into account the multidimensional nature of the GMO 
regulation. Next, using this index and its components as dependent variables, we test 
which factors highlighted by the theoretical literature are important in explaining the 
restrictiveness in GMO regulation. Importantly, the analysis takes into account the 
role of the market for information. Indeed, while several papers have stressed the 
important role played by the media in shaping consumer perception and behavior on 
food safety standards in general, and on GMOs in particular (see, e.g., Verbeke et al., 
2000; Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2004; Swinnen et al. 2005), a formal test on the 
effects of media markets on the GMO regulatory process is still lacking. Our paper 
represents a first effort to fill this gap. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure and strategy 
in building the composite index on GMO regulation. Section 3 reviews the 
theoretical literature on the determinants of food standards and GMO regulations. 
Section 4 presents the data and the econometric strategy. Section 5 provides the 
results of the empirical analysis and, finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Across-country differences in GMO standards and regulation 
 
2.1   Sample and data sources  
To study the GMO regulation determinants it is necessary to compare regulations 
around the world. However, until now a benchmark index on GMO regulations has 
been lacking. The first aim of this section is to describe our strategy to construct such 
an index.  
We build the GMO regulatory index for 60 countries, collecting available 
information on laws and acts ruling GMO cultivation and commercialization. We 
collected data until June 2008, so that the large fraction of considered GMO 
standards was in place in 2007, or before. Note that, especially for some developing 
countries, significant delays in regulation enforcement could have occurred for 
political and technical reasons. Hence, the relative GMO restrictiveness ranking for 
some developing countries could be slightly biased up-ward (see below). 
Country sample includes most of the EU countries and OECD members, the 
most important exporters and producers of agricultural goods, and several developing 
countries. Table 1 lists all the countries. The countries in the sample were selected on 
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the basis of their economic relevance in agricultural international markets, and on 
sufficient availability of information on GMO regulations. 
The main information sources used are Global Agriculture Information Network 
(GAIN) reports on biotechnology, provided by the Foreign Agricultural Service 
(FAS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). For missing 
information we referred to official national acts and reports. 
 
2.2 Computational strategy 
Our GMO regulatory index is built in the same spirit as the Ginarte and Park (1997) 
intellectual property rights (IPR) index. Six different categories of GMO production 
and commercialization regulations were taken into account: (1) approval process, (2) 
risk assessment, (3) labeling, (4) traceability, (5) coexistence, and (6) membership in 
international agreements on GMOs. Each category was scored with a value ranging 
from 0 (first condition) to the highest number of conditions identified for the 
category. Table 2 reports the respective score conditions. Higher scores indicate an 
increasing restrictiveness of the regulatory dimension. For example, for ‘GM-free’ 
countries (where no GMOs can be cultivated or commercialized) the highest score is 
assumed. In what follows we propose a summary discussion and justification of each 
regulatory dimension. For a more exhaustive discussion, see Vigani (2010).  
 
2.2.1   Approval process 
The approval of a GMO is the basic condition to permit its entrance in the domestic 
market, both for cultivation and/or for consumption. Without approval, it is not 
possible to introduce the GM product into the country. 
Approval requirements vary widely across countries, but there are two main 
approaches. One is the EU approach based on the ‘precautionary principle’, which 
states that any product produced with, or derived from, transgenic crops is subject to 
specific regulations and the consumer’s ‘right to know’. The second is the US 
attitude of ‘substantial equivalence’, which exempts essentially equivalent products 
from any specific requirements (Gruére, 2006). Lying between these two extremes 
there are further approaches to approval. 
We defined five levels of restrictiveness (from 0 to 4) based on the country’s 
approach and on the degree of implementation of the regulation. A score of 0 is 
given when there are no approval procedures; a score of 1 if the legislator decided for 
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a mandatory approval process, but it is not yet enforced; a score of 2 when the 
mandatory approval process follows the principle of substantial equivalence; a score 
of 3 when the mandatory approval process follows the precautionary principle; a 
score of 4 for GM-free countries. The zero and first conditions include developing 
and emerging countries that tend to take advantage of the absence of a defined 
regulation, adopting the so called “wait and see” strategy. By not taking a clear 
position with respect to the approaches of the EU (more restrictive) and US (less 
restrictive), the countries remain open to both markets. 
 
2.2.2    Risk assessment 
Approval depends on a positive risk assessment, which consists in the analysis of 
potential harmful effects of the new organism on humans, animals and the 
environment. The typology of the tests depends on the country approach, whether it 
is based on the substantial equivalent or the precautionary principle. 
Biosafety assessment is progressively gaining importance as it is the target for 
setting a common international methodology, but discussions and bargaining are still 
in progress. Countries possessing native plants need tests for potential gene flow 
from GM crops to their wild (native) relatives. Biosafety assessment requires 
expensive field trial programs, and some countries (e.g. developing countries) are not 
able to deal with these costs. 
We identified four requirement levels (range 0-3). Both conditions 0 and 3 
indicate the absence of risk assessment, but, whereas 0 indicates a normative void 
that does not affect GMOs trade or cultivation (e.g. Ukraine), condition 3 is applied 
to GM-free countries that do not require any risk assessment as the importation and 
cultivation of GMOs are a priori banned. Between these two extreme situations, a 
score of 1 is assigned when the risk assessment is at the proposal stage, while a score 
of 2 is for when risk assessment is compulsory. 
 
2.2.3    Labeling 
According to the threshold level, labeling directly informs on the presence of GM 
ingredients in the product, but indirectly a label can also act as a hazard warning, 
affecting the demand for GM and non-GM products (Gruère, 2006). 
There is a wide variety of different labeling regimes across countries, and these 
differences are mainly due to production, development and trade related factors. 
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Developed and less agriculture-dependent countries are more likely to adopt GM 
labeling regimes, due to consumer demand for food information. Differently, 
developing countries are more exposed to regional influences and trade relationships. 
Moreover, countries producing or exporting GM products tend to adopt more 
pragmatic and less costly labeling policies. Such costs depend on the threshold level, 
on the capacity of the public authority to enforce labeling requirements, and on the 
capacity of the industry to comply with labeling rules. Hence, to comply with a 
restrictive threshold implies more onerous costs. 
Countries may decide to adopt voluntary or mandatory labeling. Labels can be 
on the finished product (Australia and Japan), and/or on GM technology as a 
production process (EU and China). In the former case, the quantification of GM 
ingredients is required, and, usually, the threshold is higher. In the latter case any 
product derived from GM crops must be reported. In this case thresholds are lower. 
We identified five categories of labeling (0-4): 0 in the absence of labeling; 1 
with voluntary regime; 2 with mandatory regime and threshold higher than 1%; 3 
with mandatory regime and threshold equal or lower than 1%. Finally, 4 is assigned 
to GM-free countries. 
 
2.2.4    Traceability 
Traceability is an instrument used by some countries to guarantee efficient GMO 
product withdrawal from the food and feed market if any unexpected effect occurs to 
health and the environment. It involves all the actors of the food chain, retracing the 
history, use, and location of a product by means of recorded identification. 
Farmers must comply with certified storage and harvesting, while elevators, 
operators and retailers must keep information on product identity and transmit it by 
lot numbers. This information must be retained for a long period (5 years post-
market monitoring), and must be available for applicants. All these requirements 
induce increasing costs sustained by the production and supply chain, but also benefit 
the market niche gains.  
For traceability we defined the following scores: 0 if the regulation does not 
require traceability or identity preservation (IP); 1 if the traceability requirement is at 
the proposal stage or if an IP system is implemented; 2 if traceability is mandatory; 
and 3 if the country is GM-free. 
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2.2.5    Coexistence 
The purpose of coexistence is to guarantee consumers and farmers the possibility of 
choice between GM, traditional and organic products. Coexistence is based on IP 
among crops, which must be segregated in time and space. Thus, it is not possible to 
cultivate contiguous fields of GM and organic crops, or to manage such crops in 
short rotations. In addition, coexistence may require mechanisms preventing pollen 
flow (such as distance or pollen barriers), as well as refuge areas and dedicated 
machinery. Of the utmost importance are the cooperation between neighboring 
farmers and compensation and liability schemes. 
Production costs increase due to the isolation, monitoring, purity testing, and 
dedicated equipment. The affordability of coexistence is related to the level of 
development of the country. In developing countries some policy makers take for 
granted that coexistence is not feasible or can be done only by facing prohibitive 
costs.  
Policy makers face great difficulties in setting up coexistence strategies, given 
the divergent preferences of organic and GM producers. Typically, organic producers 
and consumer groups lobby against the authorization of GMO cultivation, and hence 
ask for very restrictive coexistence regulations (e.g. extremely long distances 
between fields), impeding de facto the cultivation of GM crops. 
We decided to score with 0 those countries without any coexistence rule; 1 if 
coexistence policies are still far from enforcement (e.g. the government decided on 
the need of coexistence policies, but field guidelines are still under discussion); 2 if 
partial guidelines were prepared; 3 if exhaustive coexistence guidelines are adopted; 
and 4 if the country is GM free. We could not exploit distances in score definition 
because of the lack of information for all the countries. 
 
2.2.6 Membership in the international agreements 
We considered two main agreements, the Codex Alimentarius and the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, which are the most diffused and developed agreements on 
GMOs. 
The purpose of the Codex Alimentarius is to define international standards to 
protect consumer health and promote fair relationship in trade practices. It has 
successfully reached an agreement on safety assessment procedures for GMOs, but 
no formal labeling standard has been yet achieved. 
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The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (BSP) is part of the United Nations 
Convention on Biodiversity, and it introduced a procedure for risk assessment, risk 
management and trans-boundary movements of living modified organisms (LMOs). 
The BSP requires a comprehensive risk assessment and risk management framework 
provided by the exporter before the introduction of any LMO in the importer 
territory. The BSP was proposed as a primary policy for those countries without 
domestic regulations on GMOs and to protect countries holding most of the global 
biodiversity, typically located in the south of the world. To comply with BSP 
requirements is costly, and developing countries could benefit from collective funds 
provided by the agreement. 
If a country does not adhere to either of the two agreements the score is 0, 
otherwise the score is 1 or 2 when subscribing to one agreement or both, 
respectively. 
 
2.3 The GMO regulatory index and its components: Stylized facts  
The overall GMO index is obtained by the unweighted sum of the scores of the six 
categories described above.2 After normalization, the final GMO index takes values 
between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate a more complex regulation that suggests a 
higher restrictiveness in GMO cultivation and commercialization.  
Table 1 provides the list of countries covered, and their respective GMO index. 
None of the countries in the sample have a GMO index equal to 0. Indeed none 
totally ignore the need to regulate GMOs. For example, in Hong Kong, which has the 
lower restrictiveness in GMO regulation (equal to 0.10), the introduction of a risk 
assessment procedure has been proposed, and a voluntary labeling regime is 
enforced.  
Several interesting patterns emerge from Table 1. First, we observe the expected 
polarization of the two leading countries in GMO regulatory setting: the US and the 
EU. The former has a GMO index of 0.35, in contrast with the EU average of 0.69. 
Second, with the exception of the two GM-free countries Zambia and Zimbabwe, 
developing countries tend to be in the low part of the ranking. In contrast, OECD 
countries are uniformly distributed throughout the ranking. 
                                                          
2
 The possibility of assigning a different weight to the categories has been considered. Nevertheless, 
the absence of a theory on how to distribute the different weights led to the option of accepting a 
uniform degree of category importance. 
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Third, in addition to the EU, other major agri-food importers like Japan (but not 
South Korea) have a relative restrictive GMO regulation, while major exporters (e.g. 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Ukraine) have a “soft” regulation according to their 
comparative advantage in the production of agricultural products. Finally, within the 
EU countries there is a certain degree of heterogeneity. The highest score (0.75) was 
found for countries like Austria and Italy that have imposed a de facto ban on the 
cultivation of GM maize approved by the European Commission. Moreover, the 
majority of Italian and Austrian regions are members of the European GMO-free 
Regions Network. In contrast, Spain and Germany have significantly lower scores, 
equal to 0.60 and 0.65, respectively. At the time of the data collection, both countries 
had less restrictive regulation. To date, Spanish GMO regulation is almost unchanged 
and GM maize is still cultivated. In contrast, in the last few years Germany's 
regulation has become increasingly restrictive, including on GMOs cultivation. The 
index does not reflect the changes occurred in Germany because built on earlier 
information of 2008.  
Table 3 provides the summary statistics and correlation matrix of the index and 
its components. First, and not surprisingly, some categories are strongly related to 
each other, i.e. in many regulations an approval process cannot be conducted without 
risk assessment. The strongest correlation is between labeling and approval process; 
traceability and labeling and coexistence and traceability. However, what is 
interesting to stress here is that the correlation coefficients across components are 
often lower than 0.50, suggesting that they add substantial information to the overall 
index.  
 
2.4    Statutory and factual restrictiveness in GMO regulation 
One important aspect in dealing with regulation is the discrepancy that often exists 
between written laws and how they are actually applied. To calculate the index, we 
decided to exclusively use written GMO regulations as source of information. This 
permits to reduce at minimum the subjectivity bias, but we are aware that regulation 
enforcement may vary.3  Because factual laws are the ones that have a concrete effect 
                                                          
3
 We decided not to account for information on the functionality of regulatory systems, because this 
information mainly come from potentially biased sources, such as newspapers, green organization, 
biotech companies, etc. For example, India provides a full portfolio of acts ruling production and 
commercialization of GM crops and derived products, but its regulatory system is highly 
dysfunctional, affecting laws enforcement. Information on the functionality of the Indian GMOs 
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on consumers, production and trade, in this section we discuss some examples of the 
differences between statutory and factual GMO regulations. 
In general, lack of regulation implies a great degree of uncertainty which may 
prevents field trialing, production and/or importation of GMOs and a number of 
developing countries are subject to such condition. Furthermore, in many cases lack 
of regulation is a transitory state which can turn into a very restrictive regulatory 
environment as soon as the transition period ends. For instance, according to 
regulation until 2008, Peru and Turkey are ranked by the GMO index as two 
countries with the least restrictive regulatory environments in the world. Yet, Turkey 
has recently installed one of the most onerous biotech regulations and Peru has been 
legislating itself into a GM-free country. The GMO index does not have a time 
variation, hence, unfortunately, we are not able to capture these effects.4 
Moreover, some developing countries do not have clearly defined GMO 
regulations. For example, in Mexico and Vietnam the labeling of GMO ingredients is 
compulsory, but no labeling threshold is defined and not well specified exemptions 
are permitted. A lack in the labeling threshold can represent a factual ban on GMO 
imports induced by control organisms that, in the attempt to avoid testing ambiguity, 
react with an overall rejection of products containing GMOs, but we do not have 
objective proof of the ban. On the contrary, comprehensive regulation provisions, 
despite rather streamlined and not particularly complex, may lead to an 
overestimation of the stringency. Regulations that specify minimum threshold 
content permit GMO imports, even though the threshold is very restrictive. As a 
result, it is more likely to overestimate GMO regulation restrictiveness in those 
countries where regulations are well documented and comprehensive, such as OECD 
or EU countries (e.g. the Netherlands and Portugal). 
Another important aspect affecting regulation decisions are the international 
trade rules. Following WTO agreements, it is not possible to discriminate imported 
products from domestic ones. Policymakers must comply with WTO rules but, at the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regulatory system comes from not-official highly-subjective sources. Because we rely exclusively on 
written laws, and this does not permit to register the level of functionality of the Indian regulatory 
system, the Indian position in the index ranking may appear biased, but it reflects what is included in 
the Indian law’s requirements. 
4
 To date, no major changes occurred in the GMO regulations of the countries analysed, in particular 
in the European Member States and other important countries such as the US. It is necessary to wait 
some more years to achieve sufficient heterogeneity allowing updating the GMO index. 
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same time, they are interested in maintaining the voters’ confidence, taking into 
account domestic consumers and producers preferences. Hence, despite statutory 
regulations permitting GMO commercialization and cultivation, in some countries 
GMOs are factually not cultivable or tradable because of domestic public opinion 
preferences. For example, the EU provides Member States (MS) with directives that 
must be enforced by national laws, and that comply with WTO rules. But the way the 
single MS translates the directive by mean of national law creates the factual rule. 
Extremely important for the effective cultivation of GM crops in the EU is the 
approval of coexistence protocols. Despite GM maize have been approved for 
cultivation in the EU, only 5 countries (Czech Republic, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia 
and Spain) out of 27 are producing GM maize (James, 2012). The absence of 
approved coexistence protocols at the national level was one of the major reasons 
supporting the prohibition of GMO cultivation. Without coexistence measures it is 
not possible to guarantee consumers and producers the choice between GM, 
traditional and organic products, but at the same time the approval of these measures 
allow farmers to cultivate GM crops. If the approval of coexistence measures is 
delayed or blocked, GM cultivation is de facto impeded. Hence, in several MS, it 
took many years to issue coexistence protocols despite the European Commission 
required each MS to provide protocols in 2003 with Recommendation 2003/556/EC. 
 
3. Determinants of GMO standards: theoretical considerations 
The purpose of this section is to identify those factors that the theoretical literature 
indicates as key determinants of GM regulations and standards. Government policies 
depend on several factors that drive stakeholders’ preferences and the political 
equilibrium. But it is not only the internal characteristics of a country that matter in 
standards formation. There are also important exogenous factors that influence policy 
decision, such as trade relations in general and regional trade agreements (RTA) in 
particular. 
The theoretical literature emphasized some of these factors through different 
approaches. Some authors explained GMO standards formation mainly as a function 
of trade interests. For example, Tothova and Oehmke (2004) developed a Krugman-
style trade model (Krugman, 1979) that showed that countries select standards taking 
into account enforcement costs, loss of productivity and loss of trade. Particularly 
relevant in our context is the two-country partial-equilibrium model developed by 
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Lapan and Moschini (2004) to capture international trade implications of GM 
technology adoption. In the model, the factors that influence GMO regulation are 
compliance costs, consumer preferences, income level, and differences in price 
between GM and GM-free products. The authors showed that the introduction into 
the market of GM products may lower welfare due to costs associated with the 
regulation, but, at the same time, the regulation may redistribute income among 
trading partners, and may benefit importing countries. 
Given the rent distribution associated with the adoption of GMOs, a political 
economy perspective that allows for interest groups to explain standards formation 
appears to be an essential ingredient to analyze the determinants of standards. For 
example, Fulton and Giannakas (2004) showed that the political equilibrium depends 
on the efficiency in producing pressure among three lobbying groups (consumers, 
producers and companies) that compete for different policy outcomes under labeling 
and no labeling regimes, and also in absence of GM products. Consumers’ welfare is 
reduced when there is aversion to GM products and IP costs are high, and producers’ 
welfare is reduced when consumer aversion and GM seed costs are high. Companies’ 
preferences are driven by profit maximization, depending on demand for GM seeds 
and company market power. Gruère et al. (2009) developed a proportional voting 
model where labeling policies are decided under the influence of pressure from 
producers, green party and voters. They pointed out that production and trade related 
interests play a dominant role in the choice of labeling policies. Vandemoortele 
(2011) developed a dynamic model of government decision making on technology 
regulation and standard that illustrates that differences in GM regulation between the 
US and the EU are driven by consumer preferences and protectionist purposes. 
 
3.1   Optimal standards formation and the role of the mass media 
The political economy model that better describes GMO standards formation is the 
model of optimal public standards formation developed by Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2011), and extended in Vandemoortele (2011). This model is based 
on the Grossman and Helpmann (1994) theory that explains trade policies formation 
as an equilibrium outcome of the activity of special interest groups. These groups 
make political contributions in order to influence government decision making. From 
this model it is possible to derive some predictions about the relevant factors 
affecting the stringency of standards.  
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Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) considered two active lobbying groups, 
namely producers and consumers. Both groups are politically organized to lobby in 
favor of the preferred standard. In an open economy, the standard benefits consumers 
because it guarantees the preferred quality characteristics of the product, while 
producers’ production costs rise in implementing the public standard. Producers and 
consumers may lose or gain in the presence of the public standard, hence their 
contribution in favor of a certain standard level depends on the marginal effect of the 
standard on producers’ profit and on the marginal change in consumer surplus. 
Formally, the model defines domestic welfare, W, as the sum of producer profits, 
Πp, and consumer surplus Πc: 
 
(1)     ሺ ሻ    ሺ ሻ    ሺ ሻ     
 
The optimal standard level corresponds to the optimal standard for the 
government. The optimum for the government is given by the sum of groups’ 
contributions, Ci, and total domestic welfare. Hence, the government maximizes its 
objective function, that is:  
 
(2)       ሺ ሻ      ሺ ሻ      ሺ ሻ   ሺ ሻ    
 
where,    and    are coefficients of lobbying strength of producer and consumer 
organizations, respectively. The government will choose that level of the standard 
that maximizes its objective function. Contributions (Ci) are optimal when producer 
profit and consumer surplus are maximized. As a result, the government will choose 
that standard which maximizes producer profit and consumer surplus to obtain the 
maximal contributions. 
The effect of the standard on producer profit and consumer surplus may be 
positive or negative. If the marginal unit cost increase is larger than the marginal 
price effect in the presence of the standard, the producers’ profit decreases with an 
increase of the standard, vice versa the producer gains from an increase of the 
standard. If the marginal consumption effect exceeds the marginal increase in costs 
of consumption, the aggregate consumer surplus increases with the standard, vice 
versa the aggregate consumer surplus decreases with the standard. 
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The optimal standard level is a function of several variables, namely the 
lobbying strength of pressure groups (         ), consumers’ preferences, products’ 
price with and without the standard, and production and transaction costs.5 
Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) analyzed two further important 
determinants of food standards, namely trade and comparative advantage. With 
larger imports (     ሻ and lower domestic production (q) the effect of a 
standard on producer profit is smaller. Consequently producer contribution 
(influence) on government decision is smaller. More imports and higher consumption 
(c) increase the aggregate consumer surplus, hence the consumers’ lobbying activity 
increases. Note that, if domestic production is extremely small or absent (q = 0), 
producers do not engage in any lobbying activity, and only consumer interest affects 
the government policy outcome. These findings are consistent with both Tothova and 
Oehmke (2004) and Lapan and Moschini (2004). Moreover, standards can affect 
both production and transaction costs. If producers have a comparative disadvantage 
in standardized good production, they will oppose standards reducing political 
contribution. But there might be an opposite effect. Importer countries with higher 
production costs may be more efficient in complying with the standard, hence this 
comparative cost advantage in transaction costs encourages national producers to 
contribute in favour of the standard, reducing foreign country export opportunities. 
Vandemoortele (2011) provides an important extension of the model of Swinnen 
and Vandemoortele (2011). The author includes the effect of a biased perception of 
the standard. This bias affects standard preference due to the level of consumer 
information, where the primary source of information is the media. Hence, the media 
greatly contributes to forming consumer attitudes on standards. 
Several papers have highlighted the important role played by the media market 
in shaping consumer perception and behavior on food safety standards (see, e.g., 
Verbeke et al. 2000; Swinnen et al. 2005; Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2004).  
A small but growing literature has recently formalized the behavior of the media 
into a political economy structure (see Prat and Strömberg, 2011, for a recent 
survey). Strömberg (2004), in his model of mass media and political competition, 
highlights a media bias to deliver news toward large groups and groups more 
                                                          
5
 A change in consumer preferences affects aggregate demand and consumer surplus. Higher 
consumer preferences result in higher consumer surplus, hence in higher contribution for the preferred 
public standard. On the other side, higher marginal unit costs reduce the benefit of the standard for the 
producer, which will reduce the contribution for the public standard. 
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valuable to advertisers, increasing voter awareness and response to political actions.6 
At the same time, Prat and Strömberg (2005) showed that a shift from state-control to 
private-control of TV news, increases voter information and political participation.  
Building on these predictions, Olper and Swinnen (2013) studied the 
implications for agricultural and food policies. These implications can be extended 
also to food standards. The starting point is that in agricultural and food markets, 
government policies are biased in favor of urban consumers’ interests in poor 
countries and farmers’ interests in rich countries. Moreover, according to Prat and 
Strömberg (2005), an increase in the share of commercial media (vis-a-vis state 
controlled media) should increase the information available and the political 
participation of (large) groups of consumers who, under the mass media state 
monopoly, had less information. This suggests that the restrictiveness of food 
standards in developed countries might also be related to the structure of the media 
market (private vs. state media). Indeed, commercial TV and radio stations, as well 
as written press, are now the dominant players of the media market in both Europe 
and other developed countries (Swinnen and Francken, 2006).  
An important consideration to understand different consumer attitudes on GMOs 
between developed and developing countries is provided by Curtis et al. (2008). 
Following the theoretical approach of McCluskey and Swinnen (2004), they suggest 
that consumers’ risk perception associated to GMO is lower in developing countries, 
due to the more difficult access to media and less leisure time availability with 
respect to developed countries. Both factors increase the costs of media consumption. 
Building on this intuition, Vandemoortele (2011) goes further, showing that in 
developing countries the relative higher cost of media access leads to lower media 
consumption. Consequently, reported risks are proportionally less in poor countries 
than in rich ones. Thus, the media structure in rich countries increases attention to 
risk, promoting consumer preferences in favour of the standard. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Strömberg argues that if more informed voters receive favorable policies, then mass media should 
indirectly influence policy formation because it provides most of the information used by people in 
voting. 
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4.  Empirical specification, data and econometric issues  
 
4.1 Empirical specification  
On the basis of the theoretical background presented in section 3, we selected four 
different groups of potential explanatory variables of GMO regulations: trade and 
comparative advantage, structural determinants, institutions, and the media market. 
All the data used for the explanatory variables predate the GMO index to reduce 
potential endogeneity bias. Table 4 provides summary statistics and year of the data, 
while Table 5 provides correlations between explanatory variables. 
In the first group “Trade and comparative advantage” we include three variables. 
The first is the export share of agri-food products on total exports in two relevant 
markets, the EU and Japan as an aggregate (EU-JPN Export share). We selected 
these markets because they are net importers of agri-food products and also because 
the safety of GM products is a sensitive issue for consumers in both countries 
(Grueré, 2006). GMO standards are restrictive in both the EU and Japan, and it is 
expected that countries interested in trading with them will satisfy European and 
Japanese consumers’ demand for safety. In order to avoid simultaneity bias, this 
variable is measured prior to the introduction of GMOs on the market place in 1996. 
Trade data are taken from the UN COMTRADE database, through the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) service provided by the World Bank. Second, we 
controlled for the (applied) level of tariff protection (Applied tariff). The rational is 
the following: several authors (Fischer and Serra, 2000; Anderson and Jackson, 
2004; Sturm, 2006) have stressed that standards may act as substitutes of tariffs in 
protecting the internal market through complex and costly regulatory requirements.7 
If this hypothesis holds, the GMO regulation should be negatively related to the level 
of tariffs, ceteris paribus. Following Olper and Raimondi (2008), we used a trade 
weighted average of the 2004 applied tariffs related to agricultural products, 
provided by the Market Access Map (MAcMap) database (Bouet et al., 2008) jointly 
developed by ITC (UNCTAD-WTO) and CEPII. The third variable is land per capita 
(Land pc), which represents a factor endowment ratio affecting agricultural 
comparative advantage (Anderson et al. 2004). Data of land per capita comes from 
the World Bank, WDI database. 
                                                          
7
 However, note that the fact that standards and, more in general, NTBs may act as a 
substitute/complement for tariffs trade protection, still represents an empirical question.  
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The second group of variables are the “structural determinants”. First, we used 
the percentage of organic acreage (Organic). Due to the green campaigns of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and green parties, GM and organic products 
have become representative of opposite conception of agricultural activity. On the 
one hand, GMO cultivation represents intensive agriculture characterized by high use 
of inputs (chemicals, pesticides, fuel and so on), on the other hand, organic 
production represents a sustainable and environmental friendly agriculture. A high 
percentage of organic crops can reflects producer and consumer demand for 
sustainable agriculture, hence a greater demand for stringent GMOs standards. Data 
on the percentage of organic acreages are taken from Willer and Yussefi (2000). 
Moreover, to control for the strength of agricultural lobbies we include the share of 
agricultural labour (Rural population). As is well known, small farm groups increase 
the effectiveness of the farmers’ lobby (Olson, 1985; Olper, 2007). However, as a 
high percentage of employees in agriculture can affect the weight of producers in the 
political decision-making process through the voters’ channel, a (possible) no-
monotonic relationship is considered, introducing the variables both linearly and 
squared (Rural population sq). The data on agricultural and non-agricultural labour 
come from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
The third group of variables, ‘Institutions’, contains the Polity2 index of 
democracy taken from the Polity IV data base. Polity 2 varies from -10 (worse 
autocracy) to +10 (better democracy). We converted the index to a scale from 0 
(autocracy) to 20 (democracy), where higher values are associated with better 
democracies. Countries based on a democratic political system provide greater 
representation of the population and different interests, hence policymakers take into 
account the citizens’ preferences in regulation setting. We also control for an index 
of the environmental regulatory regime (Erri) developed by Esty and Porter (2001). 
The Erri is a composite index on the quality of environmental regulation ranging 
from 0 to 4, where higher values indicate a higher regulatory quality. This index is 
built combining several aspects of the environmental regulatory regime (stringency, 
structure, subsidies, enforcement and environmental institutions). Due to the 
implications of the environmental release of GMOs, countries with greater demand 
for environmental quality may also increase the complexity of GMO regulation. 
Finally, within this variables group, we also include a proxy for the impact of legal 
contributions to political parties on public policy outcome (Lobby). We took the 
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Lobby variable from the DataGob database developed by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). This variable is built starting from surveys on business 
executives, asking answers to the following question: “To what extent do legal 
contributions to political parties have a direct influence on specific public policy 
outcomes?”. Thus, this variable represents a proxy of the extent to which the 
lobbying activity translates into government policy outcome. Lobby variables range 
between 1 (very close link between donations and policy) and 7 (little direct 
influence on policy). We converted the index to obtain an opposite value, so that the 
index still ranges between 1 and 7, but it increases in the link between lobby 
contributions and policy outcome.  
In a previous section we already discussed the (potential) important role of the 
media’s structure in determining GMO regulation. The objectives of private and 
public media are significantly different. Private ones tend to be more consumers 
oriented, and provide information in such a way as to increase media consumption. 
Food scares are of great interest for consumers and may contribute to increase the 
demand for media information. In this context, the GMO debate is delivered from an 
awareness point of view by privately controlled media. As a result, the way private 
media does business can induce consumers to ask governments for more restrictive 
GMO standards. On the contrary, public-controlled media are more government 
oriented, and will satisfy policies preferred by organized groups with greater 
lobbying power. Farmer groups are typically well organized, and it is likely that they 
will lobby in favour of cost-saving high-productive innovations (i.e. GMOs).  
Moreover, for several reasons, the effect of the media market on GMO standards 
may be conditional to the level of development. First, the level of economic 
development affects the media structure. In most of the developing countries public 
controlled media strongly prevails, while in rich countries media market structure is 
highly fragmented. In these countries a greater share of the news is delivered by 
different private media companies (press and TV) in strong competition. Second, as 
discussed above, the level of development also affects the target group of private 
media (see Olper and Swinnen, 2013). In developing countries, the target group tends 
to be the farmers group, whereas in developed countries the target is the consumers 
group. To test these predictions, we used the share of the private media computed as 
an average between private press and TVs both linearly (Private media) and 
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interacted with the GDP per-capita, (LnGDPpc*Private media). Data on the share of 
private TVs and newspapers are taken from Djankov et al. (2003). 
Finally, the last variable is the log of per-capita  GDP in PPP (LnGDPpc) taken 
from the World Bank’s WDI. The Level of development has several regulatory 
implications. For example, on the one hand some requirements are costly and for 
least developed countries their enforcement is burdensome, due to high transaction 
costs. On the other hand, it is well known that the demand for food safety regulation 
is elastic to the income level.  
In the analysis we considered 55 countries for which all the explanatory 
variables discussed above were available.8 The general specification that links the 
GMO regulation and its potential determinants is shown in the following equation: 
 
(3)  GMOi = β0 + β1 Export share + β2 Applied tariff + β3 Land pc + β4 
Organic + β5 Rural population + β6 Rural population sq + 
β7 Polity2+ β8 ERRI + β9 Lobby + β10 Private media  + β11 
Ln GDPpc*Private media + β12 ln GDPpc  + εi , 
 
Where, GMOi is the GMO index of country i, β0 is a common intercept, β1 – β12 are 
the coefficients to be estimated, and εi is an error term.  
 
4.2 Econometric issues 
A main concern in estimating equation (3) can derive from spatial correlation 
issues. In fact, regulations of countries that are spatially closed are potentially 
correlated due to the existence of regional trade agreements signed by neighbouring 
countries or other omitted factors. To tackle with this problem we use different 
strategies.  
First, the equation (3) is estimated using OLS. Subsequently, the same 
specification is estimated including regional dummies (for Asia, Latin America, 
North America, Oceania, Middle East and the EU countries) to control for the 
specificity of regional agreements in terms of GMO regulations, trade and economic 
integration. 
                                                          
8
 Specifically, the lobby variable from the DataGob database is not available for Denmark, Germany, 
Guatemala and Saudi Arabia, while the WDI database does not provide the rural population for 
Taiwan. 
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Second, we directly tackle the issue by testing for the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation in the error term, using the Moran’s I index.9 This index expresses 
the degree of similarity between spatially close countries with respect to the error 
term (Pfeier et al. 2008) and it detects the general tendency to clustering across 
countries. If the computed index is statistically different from its expected value, than 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero spatial autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Third, regression (3) is estimated also using spatial regression10 to estimate the 
relationship between the GMOi variable with the predictors Xj with j=12, taking into 
proper account the spatial autoregressive process in the error term. The spatial 
dependence is represented by the following spatial error model: 
 
             ̂           
 
Where    is the matrix of explanatory variables;  ̂ is the vector of estimated 
coefficients;   is the spatial autoregressive parameter; W is the spatial weight matrix 
of distances between countries (see Mayer and Zignago, 2011); ξ is a vector of 
spatial errors, and finally ε is the uncorrelated errors term.  
 
5. Results and discussion 
 
5.1 Determinants of GMO regulation restrictiveness  
Table 6 shows the regression results of different specifications based on equation (3), 
considering the determinants of the overall GMO regulatory index. Column (1) 
provides results from a standard OLS regression, while column (2) adds a set of 
regional fixed effects. Differently, in column (3) we use the spatial regression 
approach discussed above, with maximum likelihood estimator. The results from the 
three specifications are consistent, all the covariates have the expected sign and 
significance is quite similar across specifications.11 
                                                          
9
 The Moran’s I test is implemented in STATA, using the command spatgsa  (see Pisati, 2001). 
10 For the spatial regression we used the STATA written command spatreg with maximum likelihood 
estimator developed by Pisati (2001). 
11
 Because of the potential de jure and de facto issues discussed in section 2.4, we checked the 
robustness of our specifications by excluding from the sample those countries that are potentially 
more affected by such problems, namely India, the Netherlands and Portugal. We did several 
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At the bottom of Table 6 we report the Moran’s I test, testing whether the error terms 
are spatially autocorrelated. All the tests in columns 1, 2 and 3 are insignificant, 
meaning that in each specification the absence of spatial correlation in the residuals 
cannot be rejected, and hence errors are not spatially autocorrelated. However, the p-
value of the Morans’s I test in column 3 increase significantly, suggesting a greater 
robustness of the estimation of the standard errors. For this reason, in the remainder 
of the section and in the next section discussion will focus especially on spatial 
regressions results. 
Overall, the explanatory power of the model appears particularly high for a 
cross-country regression. Indeed, about two thirds of the variability in the GMO 
restrictiveness is explained by the selected covariates. Many of the hypotheses 
discussed above appear largely confirmed. The majority of the variables selected on 
the basis of the theory are indeed of the expected sign and, many of them, are 
statistically significant.  
Starting from trade and comparative advantage variables, all of them are of the 
expected sign. The relation between export share and GMO regulation is always 
positive, although its significance level is quite low when regional heterogeneity is 
controlled for. In accordance with the GMO index values of Table 1, these two 
markets have restrictive GMO standards (equal to 0.69 and 0.70 for the EU and 
Japan, respectively). This result tends to suggest that, ceteris paribus, the main 
trading partners of the EU and Japan that commercialize in agri-food products, also 
set GMO standards in order to have access to these markets. This result appears in 
line with the previous findings of Vigani et al. (2012), who showed that similar 
(harmonized) GMO standards increase bilateral trade flows. Moreover, the finding 
that when correcting for spatial autocorrelation the effect of the export share is no 
longer significant, suggests that regional influences explain a large part of the effects 
of trade on the GMO regulation. 
The effect of comparative advantage in agriculture, Land pc, on the 
restrictiveness of GMO standards is, as expected, negative in every specification, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
robustness checks. First, we excluded just one country at a time and all the three simultaneously. 
Second, we tested both the specifications with and without the regional fixed effects. Finally, we did 
these checks both for the OLS and the Spatial ML estimator. Results of the robustness checks are fully 
consistent with the results using the full sample of countries, suggesting that potential biases in the 
index ranking do not affect the structural relationships in the empirical model. Results of the 
robustness checks are available upon request to the authors. 
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although its estimated coefficient is significant only in column 2. This result gives 
some support to the idea that countries with a comparative advantage in agricultural 
goods are less interested in increasing GMO standards. The compliance with 
standards induces an increase in production costs, so countries with a comparative 
advantage try to keep these costs low (or aim to increase productivity through 
innovative technologies) in order to maintain their comparative advantage with 
respect to net-importers.  
Quite surprisingly, the degree of tariff protection is not significant. The popular 
view is that tariffs are negatively related to the GMO regulation, as many of the 
standards in the literature tend to be viewed as instruments of ‘protection in disguise’ 
to replace tariffs, but, at the overall level, we did not find any evidence of a 
substitution effect between standards and traditional border protection. However, as 
we will show in the next section, at the components level they have an important 
role. 
With regard to the agriculture structure variables, the share of Organic land has a 
positive but not significant coefficient, while the significant effect of Rural 
population confirms the presence of a non-linear relationship, namely the linear term 
is significantly positive and the square term significantly negative. This pattern is 
consistent with the idea that there exists a trade-off between the strength of the farm 
lobby due to group size and the importance of votes.  
Among the institutional variables, the Polity2 index is not significant, suggesting 
that the quality of the democracy is not an important determinant of GMO regulation, 
after controlling for the level of development. Differently, the quality of 
environmental regulation (Erri) plays a significant role. It is not surprising that more 
complex and restrictive environmental regimes also induce more restrictive GMO 
regulations. Consumer reticence on GMOs is not only due to GM food safety 
concerns, but also to the environmental impact of GM crops. If the government 
considers the environment to be an important public good, and consumers are 
demanding environmental protection, then the two regulations (GMO and 
environmental regulations) may go hand in hand in the same direction. 
The significant result for the Lobby variable is in line with the theoretical 
findings of Gruere et al. (2009) and Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011), confirming 
the importance of the lobbying activity on the politically optimal standard level. The 
Lobby variable captures the link between the donations to political parties and the 
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government decisions, hence our result suggests that in countries where this link is 
stronger, the GMO regulation is more restrictive. This can suggests that the lobbies 
that are more effective in their activity are those in favour of restrictive GMO 
standards, such as green organizations or associations of organic producers. 
Next, considering results of the media variables, the linear term of the share of 
private media exerts a negative effect on the GMO regulation. Differently, the 
coefficient of the interaction term with the income level is positive and strongly 
significant. This non-linear or conditional relationship suggests that at lower income 
levels a larger share of private media induces less restrictive GMO standards. 
However, when a certain level of development is reached, a larger share of private 
media induces a more restrictive GMO regulation.12 This result is consistent with the 
idea that consumers in rich countries tend to be biased against GMOs because, on 
average, they are informed by private media that have incentives to deliver ‘bad 
news’ stories due to profit maximizing motives. Hence consumers will ask for 
greater food safety, affecting government decisions in the direction of more 
restrictive standards. The relationship in poor countries changes from positive to 
negative because, in this situation, the target group of the media outlet are farmers 
and not consumers, the former being relatively larger in number. Quantitatively, 
increasing the share of private media from 0.6 to 0.8 (corresponding to about one 
standard deviation, or an increase of 33%), increase the GMO index of rich countries 
of about 13%, and decrease the GMO index of poor countries of about 25%, ceteris 
paribus.13  
The interpretation of the results on the media variables is in line with the 
hypotheses developed in Olper and Swinnen (2013) and based on the Stromberg 
theory (2004), which suggests that media competition induces a bias toward those 
                                                          
12
 The marginal effect of the media variable is LnGDPpc
Media
GMOi *1110    . Thus, the sign 
of the derivative depends on the level of development. Using results from column (3) of Table 6, the 
level of GDPpc where the relationship change signis equal to 9.13 ( 13.9
11
10  LnGDPpc ), 
that is very much closed to the median value of the distribution (8.83). Thus, for countries with a 
GDPpc lower than 9,230 US $ (= exp (9.13)), the marginal effect is negative. Differently, for an 
income level higher than this threshold, the marginal effect is positive.  
13
 The magnitude of these estimated effects is measured considering one standard deviation above and 
below the mean of the GDP per capita. Using the lower and higher GDP per capita of the sample, the 
magnitude of the estimated effects, clearly increase. 
24 
 
policies that satisfy the larger group of voters because large groups are the most 
informed, since mass media target them. Given that in developed countries the farm 
group is typically small, while in (agriculture-based) developing economies the farm 
group is relatively large, then private media should promote agricultural policies that 
favour the farmers in developing countries, rather than those in developed countries, 
ceteris paribus.14 The media effect is not only significant, but it also gives a 
substantial contribution to the explanatory power of the model. To give an idea of the 
effect we also ran a regression excluding the media variables. R-squared significantly 
decreases, passing from 0.843 (Table 6, column 2) to 0.720, suggesting that the 
media variables alone, account for about 15% of the model explanatory power, thus a 
relevant fraction.15  
 
5.2    Determinants of GMO regulatory components 
As mentioned earlier, we also ran equation (1) using each of the six components of 
the GMO index as a dependent variable. Results of the spatial regression 
specification correcting for spatial autocorrelation are reported in Table 7, and this 
section will summarize the main findings.16 
Applied tariffs has a positive and significant effect on the restrictiveness of the 
approval procedures, suggesting complementarities between this specific standard 
and traditional protection instruments. However, the level of tariff protection turns 
out to be negative when labelling, traceability and coexistence requirements are 
taken into account (see columns 3, 4 and 5). The opposite effect of tariff on the 
different components (positive on approval process, risk assessment and international 
agreement, but negative on labelling, traceability and coexistence) appears perfectly 
in line with the weak effect detected at the aggregate level (see Tab. 6). The negative 
and significant effect of tariffs on traceability and coexistence suggests substitution 
rather than complementary effect of these measures with respect to tariffs. Hence, 
reading this result from a trade protectionism perspective, it appears that different 
                                                          
14
 Indeed most of the developing countries in our sample are ranked with a low GMO index, resulting 
in less constraint in the adoption of GMO. 
15
 Using the standardized β coefficients we reach the same conclusion, the media variables are by far 
the most important explanatory variables of the empirical model.  
16
 Despite the correction with the Spatial ML estimator, we cannot accept the hypothesis that there is 
no autocorrelation in the residuals of columns 2 and 4 of Table 7. 
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component of the GMO regulation can be used for different purposes for trade 
policies.  
The Rural population is the most important structural variable affecting the 
components of the regulation, with the exception of coexistence. Also at the 
components level the not linear effect of this variable is confirmed. 
Only two of the three variables capturing institutional dimensions exert a 
significant effect, Erri and Lobby. Indeed, Erri is a significant determinant of the 
approval process, the risk assessment, traceability and international agreements, 
suggesting that these components are directly linked to the domestic regulatory 
regime. Moreover, if we consider lobbies in the EU that oppose the adoption of 
GMOs, it is probable that they prefer to intervene directly at the source, limiting the 
approval of GMO products and pushing for restrictive and complex approval and risk 
assessment procedures.  
Considering labelling policies, the result of the Export share variable confirm the 
hypothesis that consumers in the EU and Japan are concerned about GMO products 
and a more restrictive labelling requirement would allow them a greater choice 
among products not containing GMOs. Moreover, countries with a higher share of 
rural population display a more restrictive labelling regulation. This result 
concerning agriculture structure is in line with the findings of Gruere et al. (2009), 
who showed that production interests play a prominent role in labelling decision-
making. 
With respect to coexistence measures, the comparative advantage proxy, Land 
pc, exerts a negative and significant effect on coexistence, suggesting that the greater 
the comparative advantage of a country in agriculture, the less the country will set 
restrictive coexistence requirements that can pose a burden on the agricultural 
activity. Moreover, countries with a wide share of organic lands will adopt 
comprehensive coexistence guidelines. Coexistence measures impose high 
management costs and reduce the per acre productivity due to uncultivated refugees 
and boundary areas. To ensure the profitability of their differentiated organic 
products, organic producers aim to avoid any mixing with non-organic products, 
particularly with GMOs, and this starts right from beginning production out in the 
field.  
In our analysis, subscription to international agreements is motivated by several 
factors, and it is interesting that one of these is the tariff level seen in column (6). 
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Countries that have high tariff levels are more involved in international agreements 
that aim to set harmonized standards. These agreements are likely to have an 
increasing role in regulating food safety standards, and our results suggest that 
countries that have a high level of protection actively participate in the formation of 
international trade rules on GMOs. Moreover, countries that produce organic 
products, and that have an advanced environmental regulatory regime, are more 
involved in international agreements that aim to safeguard global biodiversity. 
Finally, a prominent role in determining GMO regulatory components is played 
by media variables, especially on the most sensitive components to consumers , like 
risk assessment, labelling, traceability and coexistence. The media shows 
significantly less interest in the approval process and international agreements. This 
is an important confirmation of our interpretation of the mechanism through which 
the media affects GMO regulations; for example, in developed countries competition 
in the media market tends to encourage newspapers and TV programs to target (bad) 
news towards large consumer groups, which in turn can create a policy bias in that 
direction. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
The paper has built a composite index on GMO regulatory restrictiveness for 60 
countries, including six regulatory categories, namely, approval process, risk 
assessment, labelling, traceability, coexistence and international agreements. This 
index provides an overview of the different GMO regulatory regimes world-wide. 
We confirm a significant polarization between GMO adopting and non-adopting 
countries, led by the United States on one side and the European Union on the other. 
Most of the developed and the importing countries of agri-food products tend to 
adopt restrictive GMO regulations, but in developing countries less restrictive 
requirements are more likely to be adopted, the exception being developing countries 
aiming at access to rich markets. 
In a second step, our GMO regulatory index was used to study the determinants 
of regulatory restrictiveness. Starting from the main propositions highlighted in the 
theoretical literature, we tested the role played by explanatory variables clustered in 
four groups: trade and comparative advantage, agriculture structure, institutions and 
the media market. The results gave a general confirmation of several arguments 
suggested by the theory, showing that the main determinants of restrictive GMO 
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regulation are the absence of comparative advantage in the agricultural sector, a 
strong presence in the country of rural population, and stringent environmental 
regulations. Moreover, tighter labelling requirements are driven by high exports to 
the EU and Japan, while a strong presence of organic farming leads to more 
restrictive coexistence measures. Last but not least, we empirically found a 
fundamental role played by the structure of the media market in determining the 
stringency of GMO standards. In rich countries, competition between commercial 
media induces information bias by disproportionally reporting ‘bad news’ on food 
safety issues – which translates into policy bias, namely more stringent GMO 
standards. In developing countries this relationship is reversed, as the main target 
group of the media-induced policy bias is the (large) farm group. 
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Table 1. Country coverage and their GMO regulatory indexes 
 
Notes: the table reports the countries sorted in 15 ranks, from the less to the most restrictive GMO 
regulation. Within each rank, countries share similar level of restrictiveness and are sorted by 
alphabetical order. European Union has been calculated as the simple mean of the MS’s indexes. 
 
Rank Country Index Value Rank Country Index Value
1 Hong Kong 0.10 9 Australia 0.55
2 Bangladesh 0.15 9 Switzerland 0.55
2 Peru 0.15 10 Norway 0.60
2 Sri Lanka 0.15 10 Poland 0.60
2 Turkey 0.15 10 Spain 0.60
2 Ukraine 0.15 10 United Kingdom 0.60
2 Venezuela 0.15 11 Germany 0.65
3 Israel 0.20 11 Greece 0.65
3 Jamaica 0.20 11 Ireland 0.65
3 Kenya 0.20 11 Luxembourg 0.65
4 Canada 0.30 11 New Zealand 0.65
4 Guatemala 0.30 11 Romania 0.65
4 Philippines 0.30 11 Slovakia 0.65
4 Singapore 0.30 11 Slovenia 0.65
4 South Africa 0.30 11 Sweden 0.65
4 Taiwan 0.30 12 European Union 0.69
4 Vietnam 0.30 13 Estonia 0.70
5 Chile 0.35 13 Finland 0.70
5 India 0.35 13 Japan 0.70
5 Indonesia 0.35 14 Austria 0.75
5 Malaysia 0.35 14 Belgium 0.75
5 Mexico 0.35 14 Czech Republic 0.75
5 United States 0.35 14 Denmark 0.75
6 Argentina 0.40 14 France 0.75
6 Thailand 0.40 14 Hungary 0.75
7 Colombia 0.45 14 Italy 0.75
7 South Korea 0.45 14 Netherlands 0.75
7 Russia 0.45 14 Portugal 0.75
7 Saudi Arabia 0.45 15 Zambia 1.00
8 Brazil 0.50 15 Zimbabwe 1.00
8 China 0.50
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Table 2. Categories and conditions scores. 
 
 
Score
(1)   Approval process
Absence of GMO approval procedures 0
Mandatory approval process, but  far from enforcement 1
Mandatory approval process adopting the principle of substantial equivalence 2
Mandatory approval process adopting the precautionary principle 3
Countries declared 'GM free' 4
(2)   Risk assessment
Absence of GMO risk analysis 0
Proposed risk assessment, but far from enforcement 1
Mandatory risk assessment 2
Countries declared 'GM free' 3
(3)   Labeling 
Absence of labeling policies 0
Voluntary GMO labelling 1
Mandatory GMO label without threshold or with threshold  >1% 2
Mandatory GMO label with threshold  <= 1% 3
Countries declared 'GM free' 4
(4)   Traceability
Absence of GMO traceability or an IP system 0
GMO traceability far from enforcement, or is in place an IP system 1
Mandatory GMO traceability 2
Countries declared 'GM free' 3
(5)   Coexistence
Absence of coexistence rules 0
GMO coexistence policies far from enforcement 1
Partial guidelines on GMO and non-GMO coexistence 2
Exhaustive guidelines on GMO and non-GMO coexistence 3
Countries declared 'GM free' 4
(6)   Membership in international agreements
No adherence to international agreements 0
Adherence to a single international agreement 1
Adherence to both international agreements 2
Regulatory Categories
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Table 3. Summary statistics and correlations between regulatory categories. 
 
 
 
GMOindex Approval 
Process
Risk 
Assessment
Labeling Traceability Coexistence Agreements
Index Statistics
   Mean 0.49 0.57 0.61 0.53 0.33 0.24 0.87
   Std. Dev. 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.26
   Min 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Correlation Matrix
   GMOindex 1.00
   Approval Process 0.85 1.00
   Risk Assessment 0.66 0.66 1.00
   Labeling 0.88 0.75 0.60 1.00
   Traceability 0.89 0.66 0.47 0.75 1.00
   Coexistence 0.80 0.52 0.39 0.54 0.72 1.00
   Agreements 0.41 0.21 0.02 0.26 0.38 0.32 1.00
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Table 4. Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
 
Notes: see text for variable explanation. 
 
Year Obs. Min Max Mean St. Dev.
EU-JPN Export share 1995 60 0.0004 0.783 0.142 0.169
Applied tariff 2005 60 0 82.100 14.654 13.070
Land pc 2005 60 0.0001 0.371 0.031 0.063
Organic 2000 60 0 0.130 0.024 0.032
Rural population 2005 59 0 84.900 32.839 20.590
Rural population sq 2005 59 0 7208.010 1495.175 1715.043
Polity2 2005 60 0 20.000 17.500 4.634
Erri 2001 60 0 3.835 1.702 0.965
Lobby 2002 56 1.1400 6.290 3.909 1.329
Share of private media 2003 60 0 1 0.697 0.226
Ln GDPpc*Share of private media 2003 60 0 10.538 6.242 2.226
Ln GDPpc 2003 60 5.9165 10.882 8.850 1.408
35 
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
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EU-JPN Exp share 1
Applied tariff -0.12 1
Land pc -0.18 -0.22 1
Organic 0.49 -0.09 -0.02 1
Rural population -0.12 0.38 -0.22 -0.14 1
Polity2 0.34 -0.26 0.12 0.27 -0.36 1
Erri 0.42 -0.26 0.19 0.57 -0.51 0.32 1
Lobby -0.22 0.11 -0.02 -0.38 0.34 -0.07 -0.76 1
Private media 0.04 -0.28 0.15 -0.05 -0.44 0.57 0.08 0.11 1
Ln GDPpc 0.39 -0.29 0.15 0.44 -0.74 0.51 0.82 -0.60 0.32 1
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Table 6. Determinants of GMO standard restrictiveness 
  
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses; regional fixed effects for Asia, Africa, Latin 
America, North America, Oceania, Middle East and the EU. In column 3, spatial regression 
with ML estimators. The Moran’s I reports the test for spatial autocorrelation. A statistical not 
significant value of the index allows accepting the null hypothesis that there is zero spatial 
autocorrelation in the error residuals.  
 
  
Spatial ML
(1) (2) (3)
EU-JPN Export share 0.226** 0.011 0.182
(0.105) (0.111) (0.143)
Applied tariff 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Land pc -0.491 -0.593** -0.449
(0.463) (0.283) (0.359)
Organic 0.479 0.833 0.274
(1.011) (0.931) (1.369)
Rural population 0.011** 0.008** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Rural population sq -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Polity2 0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Erri 0.131** 0.078* 0.135***
(0.053) (0.041) (0.050)
Lobby 0.057** 0.039* 0.056** 
(0.025) (0.021) (0.024)
Share of private media -2.971*** -3.080*** -2.921***
(0.877) (0.570) (0.657)
Ln GDPpc*Share of private media 0.326*** 0.357*** 0.320***
(0.111) (0.072) (0.081)
Ln GDPpc -0.211*** -0.222*** -0.207***
(0.077) (0.054) 0.065
1.652** 1.921*** 1.638***
(0.702) (0.467) (0.539)
NO YES NO
0.624 0.843
55 55 55
Moran’s I -0.012 -0.007 -0.019
p -value (0.291) (0.177) (0.474)
Observations
OLS
Media
Constant
Regional fixed effects
R-squared
Dependent: GMO Index
Trade and comparative advantage
Agriculture structure
Institutions
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Table 7. Results of the spatial regressions with ML estimator on GMO regulatory 
components 
  
Notes: the results are from spatial regression estimated with ML estimator. Standard errors in 
parenthesis.  
 
 
 
 
Approval Risk Ass. Labeling Traceability Coexistence Agreements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU-JPN Export Share 0.261 0.165 0.393*** 0.022 0.019 0.098
(0.183) (0.119) (0.177) (0.197) (0.202) (0.167)
Applied tariff 0.004** 0.002 -0.001 -0.004** -0.003* 0.003*  
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Land pc 0.209 -0.245 0.170 -0.858 -1.191** -1.141***
(0.490) (0.313) (0.545) (0.502) (0.603) (0.448)
Organic -2.085 -1.178* 0.457 -1.852 4.034* 2.060
(1.874) (1.182) (2.060) (1.907) (2.278) (1.682)
Rural population 0.012** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.011** 0.006 0.010** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Rural population sq -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001*  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutions
Polity2 0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.008 0.009 -0.010
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Erri 0.218*** 0.106*** 0.080 0.140** 0.136 0.114*  
(0.070) (0.044) (0.078) (0.071) (0.086) (0.063)
Lobby 0.088*** 0.046** 0.050 0.044 0.047 0.056*  
(0.033) (0.021) (0.038) (0.034) (0.042) (0.031)
Media
Share of private media -1.997** -2.059*** -2.720*** -4.535*** -4.639*** -0.421
(0.907) (0.578) (1.012) (0.928) (1.116) (0.812)
Ln GDPpc*Share of private media 0.183* 0.215*** 0.270** 0.521*** 0.541*** 0.083
(0.111) (0.071) (0.123) (0.115) (0.136) (0.010)
Ln GDPpc -0.106 -0.129** -0.152 -0.303*** -0.393*** -0.100
(0.090) (0.060) (0.100) (0.093) (0.110) (0.080)
Constant 0.681 1.245** 1.419* 2.215*** 2.960*** 1.052
(0.743) (0.494) (0.831) (0.778) (0.918) (0.680)
Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55
Moran’s I -0.015 -0.078 -0.008 -0.123 -0.010 -0.013
p -value 0.390 0.000 0.183 0.000 0.240 0.311
Dependent Variable
Trande and comparative advantage
Agriculture structure
